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Abstract
The paper investigates the mechanics through which novel technological principles are devel-
oped and diﬀused throughout an economy consisting of a technologically heterogeneous ensemble
of ﬁrms. In the model entrepreneurs invest in the discovery and in the diﬀusion of a technological
principle and their proﬁt ﬂow depends on how many ﬁrms adopt the innovation and on how long
it takes other entrepreneurs to improve it. We show that technological convergence emerges from
the competition among entrepreneurs for the proﬁt ﬂow and characterize the economy's growth
rate.
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1 Introduction
Technological diﬀusion is a crucial factor in fostering productivity growth. It is worth noting, however,
that this process is not merely the replication and imitation of known and well established techniques,
although this may be a substantial part of the whole, but is characterized by a sequence of innovations
through which the technology is spread across diﬀerent ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent production sectors.
Whilst the most radical form taken by this process is the diﬀusion of a general purpose technology (see
for example the discussion in David, 1991; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998; Helpman, 1998; Rosenberg,
1976, 1982; Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2004), it also involves the piecemeal adaptation of new artifacts
to diﬀerent usages and productive purposes. In any case, it clearly hinges on knowledge and information
transmission. As early as 1958, March and Simon (1958), in a seminal contribution concerning the
functioning of organizations, held that much innovation results from borrowed knowledge, that is from
knowledge ﬁrstly developed in other ﬁrms or in other industries. More recently, this important theme
has been further investigated by the work of Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990). Their case is based
on the well tested argument that new knowledge is strongly dependent on previously accumulated
knowledge. Furthermore, these authors argue that ﬁrms that carry out and invest in R&D are capable
of adapting knowledge originating in other ﬁrms. This is clearly a process that accounts for much
diﬀusion and ultimately for technological convergence.1
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the growth rate of an economy featuring a high degree of
heterogeneity both in terms of output variety and of the technologies that are accordingly employed and
to investigate the mechanics through which a single technological principle is introduced throughout
the whole economy. We show that entrepreneurs' investments, aimed at discovering a technological
principle and diﬀusing it throughout the economy, together with the competition among entrepreneurs
for the proﬁt ﬂow leads to the emergence of technological convergence.
Proximity in our model is deﬁned in terms of technological distance. Although much literature has
dealt with geographical networks and clustering, consider for example the rich spate of contributions
on industrial districts, we take the view that in light of the new means provided by information tech-
nologies what matters most for innovation diﬀusion is technological rather than geographical proximity
(see also Andergassen, Nardini and Ricottilli, 2006). At least for the purpose of investigating innova-
tion diﬀusion, situations where the introduction of the new technological principle needs only minor
innovations, that is, a mere adaptation, are distinguished from situations where major innovations are
1See Fai and Von Tunzelmann (2001) for empirical evidence on technological convergence.
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required. Historical evidence has in fact indicated that the eﬀective diﬀusion of a new technological
principle has often required enabling and essential complementary innovations (Goldfarb 2005). We
envisage a clustering principle responding to a criterion of technological proximity shaped by the inher-
ent problems they face, the corresponding skills and expertise they possess. The economy that results
from this view of ﬁrm heterogeneity is an ensemble of clusters that diﬀer in terms of their technological
proﬁle, each collecting ﬁrms that produce diﬀerent things but that are technologically alike. Within
each cluster, ﬁrms are still heterogeneous in terms of their performance and the goods they produce
but exhibit a high degree of technological likeness. It is important to stress that the proximity of
technological clusters is not deﬁned at the beginning of the process but depends on the evolution of
the technology.
We distinguish two types of investments. Investment aimed at the discovery of the technological
principle and investment aimed at diﬀusion throughout the economy. While the ﬁrst in quite standard,
the second one is the upshot of the assumption that ﬁrms employ heterogeneous technologies and hence
diﬀusion implies that the original innovation must be adapted to the speciﬁc needs of a new user, even
in the case of technological proximity. We assume that investments in within-cluster diﬀusion gives rise
to a learning-by-doing principle, that may lead to ideas and opportunities to introduce the technological
principle into ﬁrms belonging to other technological clusters2. In other words, it is conjectured that
technological opportunities to successfully ﬁnd applications in distant clusters emerge as a consequence
of innovative investment that leads, on the one hand, to score success within clusters and, on the other,
as a consequence of learning, generates technological opportunities to cross over to other clusters. The
learning-to adapt process lays the ground for a success breeds success feedback but it is a necessary
condition not a suﬃcient one. Leaping across technological barriers is an eﬀort of a very challenging
nature and quite distinct from that required to within-cluster diﬀusion.
Our paper is related to Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) where technological trajectories and innovation
dynamics are studied in a model of percolation in a complex technology space and Arenas et al.
(2002) where the dynamics of innovation are analyzed with a model of local interaction. Andergassen,
Nardini and Ricottilli (2006, 2009) investigate in a model of innovation diﬀusion and economic growth
with local interaction among heterogeneous ﬁrms the conditions for the emergence of technological
convergence. While in these papers the set of technological neighbors is exogenously deﬁned, in this
2Investment in the diﬀusion within a technology cluster may also lead to a reduction of costs as a consequence of a
learning-by-doing eﬀect. Hence, the greater the number of within-cluster adoptions the lower the costs and therefore the
greater the likelihood of introducing the technological principle in other clusters.
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one technological proximity is endogenously determined, depending on the characteristics and the
unfolding of the technology development process. Moreover, we show that technological convergence
is the result of investment in technology diﬀusion and the competition among entrepreneurs for the
proﬁt ﬂow.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the innovation process.
In particular, we describe technological clusters, the process of within- and between-cluster diﬀusion,
the time and space dimension of the innovator's proﬁt ﬂow and determine the innovator's incentive to
invest in the discovery and in the diﬀusion of the technological principle. In Section 3 we characterize
the resulting emergent properties of the diﬀusion process and the features of economic growth. In
Section 4 we generalize the model by considering the diﬀusion of heterogeneous technological principles
and the competition among an endogenously determined number of entrepreneurs that invest in R&D.
Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2 The innovation process
The economy we wish to deal with is composed of J ﬁnal goods each of which is produced by a ﬁrm with
a speciﬁc technique and monopoly power. We consider an R&D race of vertical non-drastic innovations
where the successful innovator replaces the incumbent. In particular, we distinguish two innovation
processes: the discovery of a novel technological principle and its diﬀusion throughout the economy.
Both are ultimately chance events the key of which is the investment that the innovating entrepreneur
is willing to devote to these tasks and they are accordingly modeled by a probability structure that
depends on investment. We start by considering the eﬀorts of just one innovator discussing later the
competition that arises thanks to a sequence of further competing productivity increasing innovations.
As a matter of reference and for simplicity's sake, the economy we discuss can be viewed as one in
which there is a representative consumer with the following utility function:
U (x1, ..., xJ) =
J∑
j=1
ln (xj) (1)
where xj denotes the quantity of good h bought. Normalizing the consumer's income to one, from the
optimal consumption choice ζjxj = 1, where ζj is the price of product j.
We ﬁrst start describing the diﬀusion process and afterward we discuss the discovery of the novel
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technological principle.
2.1 Technological clusters and diﬀusion
It is expedient to group the J ﬁnal goods according to their technological proximity in order to form
clusters of technological neighbors. These clusters are to be understood as ensembles of ﬁnal goods
that employ similar techniques. Within each, the goods that compose them are not homogeneous,
they are all produced by speciﬁc processes but the diﬀerence in terms of the technological principles
employed across clusters is far greater than within each. As stated in the introduction, the diﬀusion
of a technological principle is a matter of innovative adaptation within a cluster and a matter of
innovative application across clusters. The distance separating the latter is accordingly not apriori-
ly known but depends on the improvement and development of the technological principle that is
capable of achieving a cross-over linking clusters that may not have any beforehand likeness. There
may, therefore, be innovations that prove easily introducible whilst others do not; some innovations
that diﬀuse speedily in some clusters but do not in others or ﬁnd barriers forbidding any diﬀusion.
A technologically connected network is the result of the process, not its prerequisite. For the sake of
simplicity we assume that each cluster is composed of N goods, the whole economy to be a set of JN
clusters and consider the limit J →∞ with a ﬁnite number of goods N in each.
2.2 Within-cluster diﬀusion
Innovations lead to non-drastic productivity increases of size γ > 1. Let κ be the marginal production
cost of an incumbent ﬁrm, then the marginal production costs of an outsider ﬁrm adopting the inno-
vation are γ−1κ. Because of competition between the insider and the outsider, the price charged by
ﬁrm h adopting the technology is ζh = κ and ﬁrm proﬁts are
pih = θ°− ch (2)
where θ° ≡ 1 − γ−1 and where ch are ﬁxed costs (per unit time) of the new technology. Successful
implementation of the original technological principle depends thus on the size of the ﬁxed costs. We
designate by I the investment expenditure aimed at reducing them. We assume that for each ﬁnal good
producer h, ﬁxed costs ch, h = 1, 2, ..., J , are i.i.d. random variables that take the value θ
′ < θ° with
probability p (I) and θ′′ > θ° with probability 1 − p (I), where we assume that p (I) is an increasing
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and concave function of I, with p′ (I) > 0 for each I < ∞. Adoptions occur as long as θ° ≥ ch , it
then follows that the mean number of adoptions is nˆ (I) = Np (I), where nˆ (I) is also increasing and
concave in I. We deﬁne θ = θ°− θ′.
2.3 Between-cluster diﬀusion: the role of investment and diﬀusivity
Every economic system lends itself in varying degrees to the diﬀusion of new technological principles.
It is its structure, the degree of development and its technological capabilities that set the framework
enabling an innovation to diﬀuse. We term this feature of the diﬀusion process diﬀusivity and represent
it by a single parameter d.3
Reaching out to other clusters after the root one has been invaded requires the opening of technological
opportunities, provided that the original innovation takes oﬀ from the drawing board. These paths
away from a root cluster pry open with a probability that depends on the number of adoptions in the
root cluster, a case of learning by adopting. Learning-by-adopting is of the utmost importance since by
being conducive to the establishment of user-producer linkages, it is the instrument to gain knowledge
and expertise that may point the way to other clusters; at every new adoption the technological
principle widens its scope and the capability that is associated with it rises opening up new technological
opportunities. For simplicity's sake we assume that this eﬀect is captured by the mean number of
adoptions.4.
Assumption 1 The mean number µ(I, d) is a concave increasing function with respect to I and d,
with µ (0, d) < 1 and limI→∞µ (I, d) > 1.
The innovating entrepreneur will consider investment as a tool to maximize proﬁts. I plays a double
role generating, on the one hand, adoptions of innovations within a cluster and, on the other, through
the eﬀect of learning by adopting, increasing the mean number of new clusters that the innovator
expects to reach. In this sense, it is a case of success breeds success.
3A more realistic hypothesis is to assume that diﬀusivity varies from cluster to cluster and is not a priori-ly known to
the innovator. In this case, it can be assumed that diﬀusivities are i.i.d. random variables of which the innovator may only
conjecture the cumulative distribution function G(d, a), smooth and decreasing in a, where a is a measure of diﬀusivity
intensity: a property of the technological state of the economy which can be taken as known by the innovator. In this
case µ(I, d) =
´+∞
0 E(k | d = x)dxG(x, a) where E(k | d = x) =
´
kdkF (k, I, x) and under appropriate assumptions
about concavity, qualitative results found below still hold.
4Assumption 1 is the natural consequence of the fact that the expected number of adopters within the cluster is
increasing with respect to investment and that success breeds success. In the Appendix we restate Assumption 1
providing conditions such that µ(I, d) be a concave increasing function with respect to I and d.
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2.4 Investment and the diﬀusion of innovations
The innovator's proﬁt ﬂow has two dimensions: one in time and one in space. The proﬁt ﬂow stemming
from a single adoption continues until a new technological principle is successfully introduced by an
entrant which thereby ousts the current incumbent. This event occurs with probability λ (over a unit
time period) and clearly depends on the joint probabilities that a new seeding technological principle
appears and that it diﬀuses originating adoptions and applications both within and across clusters.
The size of the innovator's proﬁt ﬂow depends also on the number of within and between cluster
adaptations. λ will later be fully and consistently endogenously characterized.
Let r be the long-term risk-neutral interest rate that deﬁnes the macroeconomic environment and
which can be interpreted as the ﬁnancial cost to be borne when investment is undertaken.5
Expected proﬁts from the introduction of an innovation within a cluster are then pi (I, λ) = Np(I)r+λ θ,
which is a strictly increasing and concave function of I.
The diﬀusion process between clusters can be viewed as a branching process. Proﬁts that the innovator
expects to gain once step s of the diﬀusion process has been reached depend both on the within-cluster
expected proﬁts and on the expected proﬁts that can be made by reaching out to clusters one step
further, the s+1-th: the former are given by pi (I, λ) and let the latter be designated by Vs+1. Note that
expected proﬁts in a given cluster do not depend on s. The innovator's problem is then to establish
the amount of investment that determines the distribution of ﬁxed production costs, and hence the
number of adoptions within a cluster, and the expected number of new clusters that are likely to be
reached.
How far an innovation can penetrate into complex, heterogeneous economies does not solely depend
on their structural characteristics. Highly industry-speciﬁc technologies are less likely to pass across
clusters and, therefore, the time it takes for an adoption transfer to be achieved can be assumed
to be lengthier than in the case of technologies that are intrinsically easier to adapt. In this sense,
an innovator must take into account the implied diﬀusion time span and discount the probability of
successfully bridging any two given clusters. Let τ be this expected time, we denote then with ρ = e−rτ
the related discount factor. The slower is the technology likely to diﬀuse on account of its intrinsic
characteristics, the larger τ and hence the lower the discount factor ρ.
5Assuming that consumers face an intertemporal consumption choice problem with utility function´∞
0 e
σt
∑J
j=1 ln (xj,t) dt, where σ is the intertemporal discount factor, then the balanced long term growth path re-
quires that r = σ.
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Denoting by Vs the value of the innovation at the s-th step, the innovator's problem can be framed as:
Vs = max
I≥0
{pi(I, λ) + ρµ(I, d)Vs+1 − I} . (3)
which recursively deﬁnes the value of an innovation. The ﬁrst term in curly brackets represents expected
proﬁts within a given technology cluster, while the second term describes expected discounted proﬁts
from diﬀusing the innovation to other technology clusters. Both terms depend on investment since the
latter reduces the probability of high ﬁxed costs within a cluster thereby increasing the probability of
within-cluster adoptions and, because of learning-by-doing, it opens up new avenues for adaptions into
technologically distant clusters.
To insure that a unique solution to this problem exists, we must assume the following.
Assumption 2 The function pi(I, λ) + ρµ(I, d)Vs+1 is concave in I.
Assumption 2 is far from restrictive since it is satisﬁed provided that pi(I, λ) is suﬃciently concave.
Since at every step the outlook for further diﬀusion is the same as at the preceding ones, the expected
values of Vs+1 and Vs are equal, and (3) becomes
V = max
I≥0
{pi(I, λ) + ρµ(I, d)V − I} (4)
FOC for the maximum in (4) is simply:
∂pi(I,λ)
∂I + ρ
∂µ(I,d)
∂I V − 1 = 0 (5)
from which I = I (V, ρ, d, λ) is obtained. Consequently we can write (4) as
V = ψ (V, ρ, d, λ) (6)
where
ψ (V, ρ, d, λ) = pi (I (V, ρ, d, λ) , λ) + ρµ (I (V, ρ, d, λ) , d)V − I (V, ρ, d, λ) (7)
A suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique solution for (6) is that the function ψ in (7) is a
8
contraction with respect to V . Using the envelope theorem
∂ψ (V, ρ, d, λ)
∂V
= ρµ (I (V, ρ, d, λ)) (8)
from which the following suﬃcient condition for the existence of a solution to (4) is obtained:
ρµ (I (V, ρ, d, λ) , d) < 1 (9)
In the following we assume that parameters ρ and d are such that this condition is always satisﬁed
and that θ is suﬃciently large such that V is always positive.
Let V ∗ = V (ρ, d, λ) be the solution of (6) and I∗ (ρ, d, λ) = I (V (ρ, d, λ) , ρ, d, λ) . The following
Lemma holds.
Lemma 1 (i) ∂V
∗
∂ρ > 0,
∂V ∗
∂d > 0,
∂V ∗
∂λ < 0 and (i)
∂I∗
∂ρ > 0,
∂I∗
∂d > 0,
∂I∗
∂λ < 0
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider ﬁrst part (i). Using the envelope theorem it is easy to see that ∂ψ∂ρ > 0,
∂ψ
∂d > 0. Applying the implicit function theorem to (6) one obtains
∂V ∗
∂ρ =
∂ψ
∂ρ
1− ∂ψ∂V
> 0,
∂V ∗
∂d =
∂ψ
∂d
1− ∂ψ∂V
> 0 and ∂V
∗
∂λ =
∂ψ
∂λ
1− ∂ψ∂V
< 0. Let us rewrite FOC (5) as Θ = 0, where Θ = ∂pi(I,λ)∂I + ρ
∂µ(I,d)
∂I V − 1 .
Because of the second order condition ΘI < 0 and applying the implicit function theorem we obtain
∂I∗
∂ρ = −ΘρΘI > 0, ∂I
∗
∂d − ΘdΘI > 0, ∂I
∗
∂λ = −ΘλΘI < 0.
Whilst the ﬁrst two partial derivatives are quite straightforward to interpret, the third is a reminder
that the innovation value decreases when the probability of new innovations emerging as a result of
entrants' success increases. The partial derivatives with respect to investment help to shed light on
the role of the diﬀusivity parameters, d and ρ. As it is to be expected, the higher is d, that is, the
proner is the economy to diﬀusion on account of its inner technological characteristics, the larger is
investment. This is, of course, due to the positive impact on proﬁts that can be expected by exploiting
the innovative principle in a favorable technological context. The lower is τ , that is, the higher is ρ,
the easier it is for a technology to bridge heterogeneous technology clusters, due to the positive impact
on the value of innovation, the larger the investment. The larger is the probability of success of a new
entrant (λ), the lower is the value of an innovation since entrepreneurs expect to proﬁt from it for a
shorter time span, and thus the lower the investment in within and between cluster adaptations.
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2.5 The discovery of the technological principle
If any diﬀusion is to occur in this economy a seed innovation must appear. As in the case discussed
above, those who partake in the race to innovate stand a chance of success that must be grounded on
the amount of initial investment that they are willing to undertake for this very purpose. Within and
across cluster diﬀusion depends upon this initial successful event as well as on the speciﬁc investment
intended to support it. It is accordingly envisaged that such an initial innovation occurs according to
a Poisson arrival rate that depends on the intensity of investment speciﬁcally intended to research and
initially develop.
Let such a function be deﬁned by φ(H), with the usual properties φ′ > 0 and φ′′ < 0, H being the
investment magnitude. Furthermore, making an innovation market ready and potentially applicable to
a production process requires a further sunk cost, for instance the making of a prototype, the deﬁnition
of an operative book of blueprints, etc. Let this cost be designated by F . This is the crucial ﬁrst step
in the chain of events likely to lead to productivity growth and to the eventual establishment of a
true and generalized technological paradigm. It is, however, important to note that this investment
expenditure and the activity it supports are to be distinguished from those that are conducive to
learning-to-adapt and thus to within and between cluster diﬀusion. The incentive to engage in this
groundwork activity is precisely the value of the innovation and it is accordingly assumed that the
magnitude of investment H results from the following maximum problem:
Π = maxHφ (H)V (ρ, d, λ)−H − F
Since V (ρ, d, λ) is the solution of (6), the ﬁrst order condition yields H∗ (ρ, d, λ) and consequently
φ (ρ, d, λ) is the probability that a new technological principle is discovered. Using Lemma 1, the
concavity assumption of φ and the implicit function theorem it can be shown that H∗ is increasing in
ρ and d and decreasing in λ. We assume that F is suﬃciently low such that Π > 0.
3 Innovation diﬀusion and economic growth
Whilst ρ, d, are parameters that pertain, the former, speciﬁcally to the type of the new technology,
the latter to the economy's structure, λ is endogenously determined since it is the arrival rate of an
innovation applied to a single ﬁnal good. This event is generated by an entrant that if successful can
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terminate the incumbent's ﬂow of proﬁts. As such, it is an arrival rate that is jointly determined by
two components: the probability of a seed innovation φ(H) and the probability that an innovation be
adopted in the production of a single good. The latter can be derived from the expected number of
adoptions, that is by the expected number of ﬁrms that adopt over the total number of ﬁrms, J . This
magnitude can, in turn, be computed by considering the average number of adopters in each cluster
multiplied by the expected number of clusters that the innovation is likely to reach. As shown above,
the former is p(ρ, d, λ)N while the latter can be obtained recursively. The average number of clusters
reached at stage s given that zs−1 have been reached at stage s− 1 is:
E (zs) = µ (ρ, d, λ) zs−1
and thus E (zs) = µ (ρ, d, λ)
s
. Summing over all the possible stages G, dividing by J and taking into
account that the average number of within-cluster adoptions is p(ρ, d, λ)N , the probability that the
innovation reaches a particular ﬁnal good is p(ρ, d, λ)NJ
∑G
s=1 µ (ρ, d, λ)
s
. NJ
∑G
s=1 µ (ρ, d, λ)
s
is also
the expected proportion of all clusters that are likely to be reached.
Since the economy considered is very large, in the limit J → ∞, we can consistently take the limit
limJ→∞NJ
∑G
s=1 µ (ρ, d, λ)
s
. It is immediate to see that it depends on µ(ρ, d, λ) ≷ 1. If it is smaller
than 1, then branching is very short, the number of clusters reached is scant and the share of ﬁrms
that are likely to adopt vanishing small for J that tends to inﬁnity: the limit is accordingly zero; if on
the other hand, it is greater than 1, then there exists a positive and ﬁnite limit: ∆ (ρ, d, λ), i.e.
limJ→∞
N
J
G∑
s=1
µ (ρ, d, λ)
s
=
 ∆ (ρ, d, λ) > 0 for µ (ρ, d, λ) > 10 for µ (ρ, d, λ) < 1
Note that limJ→∞NJ
∑G
s=1 µ (ρ, d, λ)
s
, which is the proportion of clusters likely to be reached by the
technological principle, is also the survival probability of the branching process. If µ (ρ, d, λ) < 1 then
such a proportion is negligibly small and the branching process dies out with certainty; if µ (ρ, d, λ) > 1,
then ∆ is positive; equivalently, ∆ is the probability that all clusters be reached.
On the strength of this result, a solution, λ∗ can consistently be obtained by solving the ﬁxed point
problem
λ =
 φ (ρ, d, λ) ∆ (ρ, d, λ) p (ρ, d, λ) for µ (ρ, d, λ) > 10 for µ (ρ, d, λ) < 1 (10)
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Note that on account of the concavity of functions µ and p and since ∂V∂λ < 0 and
∂I
∂λ < 0 ,
∂φ
∂λ < 0,
∂p
∂λ < 0 and
∂∆
∂λ < 0; hence, the right hand side of the equation for µ (ρ, d, λ) > 1 is strictly decreasing
in λ leading to the conclusion that a positive λ∗ exists. In consequence of this solution the economy is
fully characterized by only two exogenous parameters, one structural, d, and one technology-speciﬁc,
ρ.
Proposition 1 For suﬃciently low r the unique solution to the ﬁxed point problem (10) is λ∗ > 0
which solves λ∗ = φ (ρ, d, λ∗) ∆ (ρ, d, λ∗) p (ρ, d, λ∗), where µ (ρ, d, λ∗) > 1 and ∆ (ρ, d, λ∗) > 0. The
corresponding economy's growth rate is
g =
γ − 1
γ
φ (ρ, d) p (ρ, d) ∆ (ρ, d)
which is increasing in d and ρ since φ (ρ, d, λ∗) ∆ (ρ, d, λ∗) p (ρ, d, λ∗) is increasing in ρ and d.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the case where r → 0 and suppose that λ = 0, implying full
monopoly power enjoyed by the innovator. As a consequence ∂∂I pi (I, λ) =
Nθ
r+λp
′ (I) → ∞, with the
consequence that the optimal investment becomes inﬁnitely large I∗ → ∞ and thus µ (I∗, d) > 1,
proving that λ = 0 is not an equilibrium solution.
To clarify this point, consider the following extreme case. For r → 0, implying an inexhaustible source
of ﬁnancial support, and suppose that λ = 0, implying full monopoly power enjoyed by the innovator,
marginal gains from investments diverge to inﬁnity. As a consequence, the amount invested in the
diﬀusion of the technological principle by the innovator will be inﬁnitely large and thus the average
number of clusters reached cannot be lower than 1, implying that λ = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
Therefore, for suﬃciently low r the unique equilibrium outcome is λ∗ > 0 with µ > 1 where the
technological principle is expected to be introduced in a fraction ∆ (ρ, d, λ∗) of all clusters and in a
fraction ∆ (ρ, d, λ∗) p (ρ, d, λ∗) of all ﬁnal goods. It is the competition among innovators for proﬁt
ﬂows that leads to this result. The historical record does show that the great innovation waves (the
railroads, electricity, the microchip and internet) have all taken place at at time of plentiful ﬁnance
and low real interest rates.
An increase in the technology-speciﬁc (ρ) and and in the economy-speciﬁc diﬀusivity rate (d) increases
the investment in the discovery of the technology principle and in its diﬀusion within and between
technology clusters thereby increasing the economy's growth rate.
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4 A more general case
We generalize the previous analysis in two ways. Firstly, we relax the assumption that all technologies
are identical, and consider the case where some technologies are more easily propagated than others.
Secondly, we consider the case where the number of innovators investing in the discovery and diﬀusion
of technological principles is endogenously determined.
4.1 Heterogeneous technological principles
In the previous section any seed technology and its related technological principle appearing with
probability φ(H∗) bear a time horizon measured by τ consequently deﬁning a technology-speciﬁc
discount factor. This assumption can be relaxed at no great cost by recognizing that innovations appear
stochastically: they can be assumed to be drawn from a distribution reﬂecting the relative diﬃculty of
each to be adaptable and transferable across heterogeneous goods. Simplifying somewhat the problem,
the idea can be retained that some technologies are intrinsically more diﬃcult to adopt by other sectors
than others, while some are simpler, a stylized fact that we model by the length of the time span, τ , it
takes to bridge two technology clusters. Let there be an ordering of 1, ...,m, ...,M possible technologies
with τ1 > ... > τm > ... > τM and the corresponding discount factors ρ1 < ... < ρm < ... < ρM .
The would-be innovator at the moment of investing in the discovery of the technological principle
does not know the type of technology that will be discovered, but knows the probability distribution
Q = {qm}Mm=1 where Pr (τ = τm) = qm and
∑M
m=1 qm = 1. We indicate with Q
′ > Q the probability
distribution Q′ that ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Q.
As a consequence, for each λ it is possible to ﬁnd the critical technology that separates those tech-
nologies that have economy-wide impacts from those that have vanishing small ones. More formally,
a critical technology m∗, if it exists, is deﬁned as
m ≥ m∗(d, λ) =⇒ µ(d, λ) > 1
m < m∗(d, λ) =⇒ µ(d, λ) < 1
where m∗ (and ρ∗m) are increasing in λ and decreasing in d. Thus, it is only for technologies above m
∗
that diﬀusion across sectors is likely to be sustained leading to economy-wide eﬀects. If this critical
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technology does not exist then we set m∗ =∞ and hence µ(d, λ) is always smaller than 1.
Once the technological principle has been discovered, the innovator solves problem (4) and thus for a
given ρm and λ the value of the innovation of type m can be determined V (ρm, d, λ). In this case we
also assume that θ is suﬃciently large such that V is always positive and ρm and d are suﬃciently
small such that ψ (V, ρm, d, λ) is a contraction for each m = 1, ...,M .
The innovator's problem to conjure up a seed innovation can now be set as:
Π = maxH
{
φ (H)
M∑
m=1
qmV (ρm, d, λ)−H − F
}
the FOC yielding H∗(d, λ) and φ(d, λ) = φ (H∗ (d, λ)).
Taking the limit for J →∞
lim
J→∞
N
J
G∑
s=1
µ (ρm, d, λ)
s
=
 ∆(ρm, d, λ) > 0 for m ≥ m
∗(d, λ)
0 for m < m∗(d, λ)
Let Γ be the number of competing innovators, then in the limit for J →∞ the probability λ of being
ousted from the production of a single ﬁnal good solves the following ﬁxed point problem:
λ =
 Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ) if m
∗(d, λ) ≤M
0 if m∗(d, λ) > M
(11)
where Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ) ≡ Γφ (d, λ)
M∑
m=m∗(d,λ)
qmp (ρm, d, λ) ∆(ρm, d, λ).
Proposition 2 If r is suﬃciently small then the solution to the ﬁxed point problem (11) is λ∗ > 0
that solves
λ∗ = Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ∗) (12)
where λ∗ = λ (d,Γ, Q) is increasing in d and Γ and λ (d,Γ, Q′) > λ (d,Γ, Q) for Q′ > Q.
The economy's growth rate is
g (d,Γ, Q) =
γ − 1
γ
Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ∗)
where technologies m ≥ m∗ ﬁnd an application in a fraction ∆(ρm, d, λ∗)p (ρm, d, λ∗) of ﬁrms, while
technologies m < m∗ are introduced in a negligible fraction of ﬁrms. The growth rate g is increasing
in d and Γ and g (d,Γ, Q′) > g (d,Γ, Q) for Q′ > Q.
14
Proof of Proposition 2. The Proof of Proposition 2 is similar to the one of Proposition 1. Consider
a technology of type m′ < M . For a given value of ρm′ there always exists a suﬃciently small r such
that for λ = 0 the incentive to invest in the diﬀusion of the innovation, and hence the amount invested,
becomes inﬁnitely large. Hence µ > 1 for each m > m′ and hence λ = 0 cannot be a solution to the
ﬁxed point problem (11).
Since Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ∗) is increasing in d and Γ and Λ (d,Γ, Q′, λ∗) > Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ∗) for Q′ > Q the result
stated in the proposition follows.
The interpretation of these results is very similar to the ones in Proposition 1.
4.2 Competing innovators and endogenous entry
The number of competing innovators can then be made endogenous by introducing a free-entry con-
dition. In this case, the probability of a seed innovation appearing is itself a function of the number
of innovators just as is the expected value of an innovation. We assume that as long as the expected
return from the investment in the discovery of the technology principle is positive, innovators en-
ter the race to snatch a proﬁt ﬂow away from incumbent monopolists by paying the involved sunk
cost F . Let us assume that r is suﬃciently small such that from Proposition 2 the arrival rate of
a technological principle is φ (H∗ (d,Γ)) and the value of the innovation of type m is V (d, ρm,Γ, Q)
= V (d, ρm, λ
∗ (d,Γ, Q)), then innovators enter as long as
M∑
m=1
qmφ (H
∗ (d,Γ))V (d, ρm,Γ, Q)−H∗(d,Γ) ≥ F (13)
For simplicity's sake we neglect the integer problem and assume that Γ is real-valued. Hence, at the
equilibrium condition (13) is satisﬁed with the equality sign. Resorting to the envelope theorem it
can be concluded that since V (d, ρm,Γ) is strictly decreasing in Γ
6, the left-hand side of this equation
is strictly decreasing in Γ insuring that a solution Γ∗ = Γ (d,Q) exists. A larger diﬀusivity d and a
Q′ > Q increase the entrepreneur's expected proﬁts ﬂow but they also increase the probability of being
ousted by a subsequent innovator; the overall eﬀect of d and Q on entry is therefore ambiguous.
Given the distribution of the M possible seed innovations and related technological principles, and
deﬁning µ (d, ρm,Γ
∗ (d)) = µ (d, ρm), it is then possible to identify the technology m∗ such that
µ (d, ρm) < 1 for each m ≥ m∗ and µ (d, ρm) > 1 for each m < m∗. The following proposition
6From Proposition 2 we know that an increase in Γ increases λ∗ and as a consequence decreases V (d, ρm, λ∗)
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holds. Let us deﬁne φ (d, λ (d,Γ (d,Q) , Q)) = λ (d,Q), p (ρm, d, λ (d,Γ (d,Q) , Q)) = p (ρm, d,Q) and
∆ (ρm, d, λ (d,Γ (d,Q) , Q)) = ∆ (ρm, d,Q).
(12)
Proposition 3 For suﬃciently low values of r, λ∗ is given by (12), Γ∗ is determined by the free entry
condition (13) and the economy's growth rate is given by
g (d,Q) =
γ − 1
γ
Γ (d,Q)φ (d,Q)
M∑
m=m∗
p (ρm, d,Q) ∆ (ρm, d,Q)
If d and Q have a positive eﬀect on entry then g is increasing in d and g (d,Q′) > g (d,Q) for Q′ > Q.
Proof of Proposition 3. If d and Q have a positive eﬀect on entry then λ∗ = λ (d,Γ (d,Q) , Q) =
λ (d,Q) is increasing in d and λ (d,Q′) > λ (d,Q) for Q′ > Q. Hence, Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ∗) in Proposition 2 is
increasing in d and Λ (d,Γ, Q′, λ∗) > Λ (d,Γ, Q, λ∗) for Q′ > Q and the result stated in the Proposition
follows.
Proposition 3 describes the growth rate of an economy where entrepreneurs invest in the discovery and
the diﬀusion of innovations throughout the economy and the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs is
determined endogenously through a free entry condition.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that technological convergence, that is, the process of diﬀusion of an
original innovative principle across a heterogeneous economy, emerges as a result of the dynamic
interplay between competition among entrepreneurs' for proﬁt ﬂows and entrepreneurial investment
decisions. In particular, we have argued that diﬀusion rests on investment aimed at introducing and
adapting a seed innovation into a cluster of ﬁrms sharing a degree of technological similarity. As a
consequence of this initial eﬀort a process of learning-to-adapt is likely to arise cumulating suﬃcient
expertise to enable the original principle to cross-over to technologically distant clusters. Investment,
therefore, lays the ground for success to breed more success. Diﬀusion is thus modeled as a branching
process and the condition for its survival has been identiﬁed. It has, accordingly, been shown that
below a precisely deﬁned threshold in terms of the expected number of clusters that at each step
are likely to be reached the process dies out while above, it stands a positive probability of diﬀusing
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over a signiﬁcant part of the whole economy. Investment to entice diﬀusion through learning-to-
adapt as well as to conjure up the original seed innovation is determined as a result of innovators
attempting to maximize their innovation value. The framework within which diﬀusion unfolds is shaped
as a monopolist-incumbent, innovation-searching entrant confrontation. This generates an equilibrium
between the incentive to invest and the probability of an innovation being introduced. This probability
has, in turn, been endogenously determined as a function of the probability of diﬀusion to penetrate the
whole economy. We have shown that the entrepreneur's investment in the diﬀusion of the technological
principle together with the competition among entrepreneurs for proﬁts ﬂows sets the economy in a
state where technological convergence occurs and general purpose technologies emerge with a positive
probability characterizing the economy's growth rate.
6 Appendix
Generalization of Assumption 1.
Lemma 2 Assume that the number k of clusters that are reachable be a random variable, the cumu-
lative distribution function of which, F (k, n, d), depends on the the number n of adoptions within the
cluster, on the diﬀusivity parameter d and is convex and decreasing with respect to both variables. It,
then, follows that mean number µ(I, d) is a concave increasing function with respect to I and d.
Assume that F (K,n, d) = 1.
Proof. The mean value of the number k of reachable new clusters, conditional on the number n of
innovations, is
E(k|n) =
Kˆ
0
kdkF (k, n, d) (14)
which is an increasing concave function of n and d.
On the other hand, by lemma 2 the probability mass function of the random variable n is
pr(n = j) =
 N
j
 p (I) j (1− p (I))N−j
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Hence µ = E(k) is
µ(I, d) =
N∑
j=0
 N
j
 p (I) j (1− p (I))N−j E(k|j)
deriving we have
∂µ(I,d)
∂I =
∑N
j=0
 N
j
 kp (I) j−1 (1− p (I))N−j E(k|j)∂p∂I
−∑Nj=0
 N
j
 (N − j)p (I) j (1− p (I))N−j−1E(k|j)∂p∂I
rearranging terms
∂µ(I,d)
∂I =
∑N−1
j=0
 N
j
 p (I) j (1− p (I))N−j−1
(N − j) (E(k|j + 1)− E(k|j)) ∂p∂I
(15)
By the properties of function (14) the right hand side of (15) is positive: hence µ(I, d) is increasing in
I.
The second derivative can be analogously calculated
∂2µ(I,d)
∂I2 =∑N−2
j=0
 N
j
 p (I) j (1− p (I))N−j−2 (N − j)(N − j − 1)
(E(k|j + 2)− 2E(k|j + 1) + E(k|j))
(
∂p
∂I
)2
+
∑N−1
j=0
 N
j
 p (I) j (1− p (I))N−j−1
(N − j) (E(k|j + 1)− E(k|j)) ∂2p∂I2
(16)
Again by the the properties of function (14), the right hand side of (16) is negative: hence µ is concave
in I.
The proof of the properties of µ(I, d) as a function of d can be proved along the same lines.
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